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THE ENVY OF GOD IN THE PARADISE STORY 
ACCORDING TO THE GREEK LIFE OF ADAM AND EVE
Lautaro Roig Lanzillotta
Anyone acquainted with the factors and actors of  envy, and who has 
been forced by circumstances to refl ect on its origin, character, and 
development, sooner or later unavoidably realises or intuits that this pas-
sion has a deeper dimension and signifi cance that escapes a fi rst analy-
sis. The apparent triangular structure of  envy, comprising the envied 
spiritual or material goods, the envious person, and the person who is 
the target of  the envy, is simply not enough to explain the complex set 
of  feelings and relations triggered by this emotion. This is obvious in 
the fact that envy may arise not only in the individual who does not 
possess a given good and desires to have it, but also in he who possesses 
it and attempts by all means to prevent others from having it. 
It thus seems that there are other less visible factors that are likely to 
explain its appearance in human relations. At any rate, there are cer-
tain necessary conditions that must concur in order for envy to appear. 
These are, for example, the existence of  a comparative frame in which 
two individuals may establish themselves as terms of  a comparison1 
in their quest for goods, a value scale that determines an individual’s 
higher or lower value according to his ability to acquire status tokens, 
and, of  course, the symbolic value of  objects insofar as they provide 
the individual with an idea of  his personal value.2
In this homage to Professor Florentino García Martínez, I would 
like to approach this complex conceptual world through the motif  of  
1 The comparative attitude of  individuals as well as the comparative frame in which 
they are involved has always been envisaged as triggering envy. According to Spinoza, 
Ethica III, prop XXIII, the former is inherent to humans beings (ex eodem natura proprietate). 
Also for D. Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature II, part. II, sect. VII, the value we give 
to reality depends more on comparison than on the intrinsic value of  things. See 
furthermore I. Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten II, 2, 1, 36 and L. Festinger, “A Theory of  
Social Comparison Process,” Human Relations (1954): 114–40. 
2 For the importance of  the symbolic value of  goods, see W. McDougal apud H. Sullivan, 
Clinical Studies of  Psychiatry (New York: Norton, 1954), 128–29. P. Salovey and A.J. 
Rothman, “Envy and Jealousy: Self  and Society,” in The Psychology of  Jealousy and Envy 
(ed. P. Salovey; New York: Guilford, 1991), 271–86 (284).
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the envy of  God developed in chapters XV to XVIII of  the Greek 
Life of  Adam and Eve (LAE ).3 In order to do so, I shall fi rst focus on this 
passus. I shall then proceed to compare it with the model the author 
is paraphrasing (Gen 2:16–17 and 3:1–7) in order to see whether the 
Bible story mutatis mutandis might have provided him with the elements 
of  his interpretation or whether one should surmise the infl uence of  
external factors, such as the existence of  discussions or commentaries 
that intended to cast some light upon divine motivation. I shall fi nally 
compare it with the Gnostic appropriation and reinterpretation of  a 
motif  that suited their Weltanschauung very well.
1. The Envy of God in the Greek Life of Adam and Eve
In chapter 15 of  LAE, Adam and Eve decide to call their children 
together in order to tell them about the transgression they committed 
in the past. Once they have all arrived, Eve narrates how the Enemy 
deceived them (110–112). She begins by relating that God had placed 
them in paradise, allotting each of  them the surveillance of  a different 
part of  the Garden (113–118). But the devil enrols the serpent with 
a view to getting the fi rst couple thrown out of  Paradise (118–127). 
By means of  the serpent, the devil manages to get into conversation 
with Eve (133ff.) in order to surreptitiously instil in her an interpreta-
tion of  God’s motivation and an attitude toward His commandments 
(142–151) that will result in the fi rst couple’s exile from the Garden 
of  Eden (154–226). 
It will be clear from the beginning that in this dialogue, which is 
a clear amplifi cation and a paraphrase of  Gen 2:16–17 and 3:1–7, 
there are no elements alien to the Old Testament story (below). God’s 
prohibition to eat from the tree in the middle of  Paradise is the same, 
the devil’s temptation in order that Eve may obviate the prohibition is 
the same, and the results of  the transgression are also the same. The 
serpent/devil slightly alters the interpersonal parameters of  the Genesis 
story, and the resulting new evaluative frame allows a complete transfor-
mation of  the relationship between the human and divine spheres. 
At any rate, the devil begins the conversation by asking Eve what 
she is doing in Paradise and she naively answers that God put them 
3 For the Greek text I use the edition by J. Tromp, The Life of  Adam and Eve in Greek: 
A Critical Edition (PVTG 6; Leiden: Brill, 2005).
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there to watch over it and to eat from it (132–136). The devil asks 
then if  they may eat from every tree in the Garden, and Eve answers 
that they may eat from all the trees except from the one in the middle 
of  Paradise (139–141): κἀγὼ εἶπον· ναί, ἀπὸ πάντων ἐσθίομεν, παρὲξ 
ἑνός μόνου ὅ ἐστιν μέσον τοῦ παραδείσου, περὶ οὗ ἐνετείλατο ἡμῖν ὁ 
θεὸς μὴ ἐσθίειν ἐξ αὐτοῦ, ἐπεὶ θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖσθε.
It is interesting to note that God’s menace (θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖσθε) 
implies that the fi rst couple already possessed one of  the divine attri-
butes, i.e. not being liable to death.4 The snake, however, obviates this 
important issue, and instead of  focusing on what they do have, namely 
immortality, it focuses on what they do not. By making her conscious 
of  what she lacks, the snake automatically introduces Eve to the fi cti-
tious evaluative frame that will result in her and her man’s exile from 
Paradise (142–151):
τότε λέγει μοι ὁ ὄφις· ζῇ ὁ θεός, ὅτι λυποῦμαι περὶ ὑμῶν. οὐ γὰρ θέλω 
ὑμᾶς ἀγνοεῖν. δεῦρο οὖν καὶ φάγε καὶ νόησον τὴν τιμὴν τοῦ ξύλου. 2 ἐγὼ 
εἶπον αὐτῷ· φοβοῦμαι μήποτε ὀργισθῇ μοι ὁ θεὸς καθῶς εἶπεν ἡμῖν. 3 καὶ 
λέγει μοι· μὴ φοβοῦ. ἅμα γὰρ φάγῃς, ἀνοιχθήσονταί σου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί, καὶ 
ἔσεσθε ὡς θεοὶ γινώσκοντες τί ἀγαθὸν καὶ τί πονηρόν. τοῦτο δὲ γινώσκων 
ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἔσεσθε ὅμοιοι αὐτοῦ, ἐφθόνησεν ὑμῖν καὶ εἶπεν οὐ φάγεσθε ἐξ 
αὐτοῦ. 5 σὺ δὲ πρόσχες τῷ φυτῷ καὶ ὄψει δόξαν μεγάλην.
There are many interesting aspects in this text, but we shall focus on 
the most relevant for our present purpose. One of  them is the already 
mentioned omission of  any reference to the impending death of  the 
fi rst couple should they transgress the prohibition. By obviating this, 
the snake is able to depict knowledge as the most relevant aspect of  
the divine. The section abounds in implicit and explicit references to 
an all-embracing kind of  knowledge (142–143: οὐ . . . ἀγνοεῖν; 143: 
νόησον; 147–148: ἀνοιχθήσονταί σου οἱ ὀφθαλμοί; 148: γινώσκοντες; 
149: γινώσκων). It should be noted, however, that this knowledge, if  
deprived of  eternity, amounts to nothing or, at any rate, not to the kind 
of  knowledge Eve strives for. Her deception lies precisely in the fact 
that Eve, by acquiring knowledge, will be deprived of  eternal life, as a 
result of  which the acquired knowledge—insofar as it is no increase in 
insight in what was, what is, and will be—will just be a pale refl ection of  
divine knowledge. Incidentally, passing though it might be, this reference 
in LAE already indicates that we are no longer dealing with the Old 
4 Cf., however, Gen 3:22; but see Ps.-Clem. Homil. 16.6.3–4.
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Testament conception of  divinity mainly focused on “divine identity,” 
as R. Bauckham suggested,5 but with an idea of  God that denotes the 
infl uence of  Greek philosophical thought on the issue, which was more 
interested in the description of  His divine attributes.
The most important issue in the section, however, is the stratagem by 
means of  which the serpent convinces Eve to eat from the tree in the 
middle of  Paradise. After making Eve aware of  what she lacks, the devil 
completes the circle of  his argument by pointing to God not only as the 
possessor of  her desired good, but also as responsible for her lacking it: 
it is an intentional grudge by the divinity that determines Eve’s lack. 
In the devil’s words, God’s envy is the reason behind the prohibition 
to eat from the tree, insofar as he intended to prevent Adam and Eve 
from acquiring the status token that would make them gods.
The scenario of  envy is now complete. In the fi rst place we have Eve’s 
envy: after realising what she lacks, Eve peremptorily needs to achieve 
what she might have but has not. This need is increased after she hears 
that her lack is due to an intentional grudge by one who has it, i.e. God. 
Eve’s envy can then be described as ascendant envy. On the other hand, 
we have God’s envy. The devil affi rms that God’s prohibition is based on 
his own interest, namely that by begrudging the fi rst couple the knowl-
edge, he actually intends to preserve for himself  that which determines 
his superiority. God’s envy can be described as descendant envy.6
In order for this complex evaluative universe to appear, however, 
there are also certain factors required. I shall now mention just two 
of  them. In the fi rst place, one needs the existence of  a comparative 
frame in which God and the fi rst couple may represent the two terms 
of  a value comparison. In Eve’s case, however fi ctitious her impression 
might be, she must in one way or another believe that she has almost the 
same status as God, since it is only knowledge that seems to separate 
her from God’s loftiness. The same applies to God’s envy, since in the 
5 R. Bauckham, God Crucifi ed: Monotheism and Christology in the New Testament (The 
Didsbury Lectures, 1996. Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998), 8–9.
6 I cannot therefore agree with the interpretation of  the passus by W.C. van Unnik, 
“Der Neid in der Paradiesgeschichte nach einigen gnostischen Texten,” in Essays on the 
Nag Hammadi Texts in Honour of  Alexander Böhlig (ed. M. Krause; NHS 3; Leiden: Brill, 
1972), 120–32. The author classes it among the examples of  descendant envy, namely, 
as an example, exclusively, of  God’s envy towards man. But our analysis reveals that 
the passage is much more complex than van Unnik is ready to admit, since placing 
God and Eve in the same comparative frame includes both directions of  envy. On the 
second variety, see next note.
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serpent’s opinion it is a grudge on the part of  the divinity that caused 
the prohibition, and this kind of  descendant envy intends to prevent 
those who are inferior but rather close to the superior individual from 
reducing the distance that separates them.7 
Secondly, we need the development of  the status tokens that rep-
resent the focus of  both envious attitudes. In our text these are both 
eternity and knowledge, insofar as they determine, as already stated, 
divine status. 
Consequently, we may suggest that, however disturbing the devil’s 
accusation against God might be, the focus of  our passage is not so 
much on God’s envy as on Eve’s envy. The devil’s stratagem is intended 
to seduce or deceive Eve, and he achieves this by fi ctitiously transpos-
ing her into an evaluative frame in which she has a right to have what 
God has. By pointing to what she lacks and by mentioning God’s envy, 
the serpent actually triggers Eve’s own envy. The blind quest for what 
she apparently lacks prevents Eve from realising that, like the dog in 
Aesop’s fable, if  she goes after what she does not have, she will even 
lose what she has.8
The end of  the story is well known: Eve yields to her desire for knowl-
edge and eats from the tree, then gives it to her husband as well, and, 
as a result, both of  them are expelled from the Garden of  Eden. From 
now on they will be subject to the chains of  mundane existence.
2. The Alleged External Influences of this 
Interpretation of Gen 2:16–17 and 3:4–5
In a rather confusing article on the motif  of  envy in the Paradise story, 
W.C. van Unnik dealt with our section of  LAE together with other 
examples from the Nag Hammadi texts.9 Following with hesitation 
7 See H. Schoeck, Der Neid und die Gesellschaft (Freiburg: Herder, 1971). 
8 See Babrius, “canis per fl uvium carnem ferens.”
9 Van Unnik, “Der Neid,” 120–32. I refer to the article as confusing, because the 
author not only mixes rather different texts with one another and the different types of  
envy included in them, but also does not attempt a systematic analysis of  the quoted 
passages in order to achieve a consistent explanation. He fi rst deals with the envy of  the 
archons towards men in the Titellose Schrift 166–167 [OrigWorld (NHC II,5) 118.25–119.6] 
and in the Hypostasis of  the Archons 137–138 [89.31–90.19], then proceeds to describe 
two general sorts of  envy, i.e. ascendant and descendant, in order to jump afterwards 
to rather different envy examples (in this case Jaldabaoth’s envy against Sabaoth in 
Titellose Schrift 154 [OrigWorld (NHC II,5) 106.19–30] and Hypostasis of  the Archons 144 
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R.M. Grant,10 who in turn followed A. von Harnack,11 van Unnik 
surmised that the origin of  this paraphrase might be a Macionite 
attribution of  envy to the God of  the Old Testament.12 As support for 
this suggestion, he quotes texts from Theophilus and Irenaeus.13 As we 
shall see, however, there are some problems with this explanation.
To begin with, as already proposed, if  we exclude the motif  of  envy, 
the passage in LAE does not add relevant new elements to its Biblical 
model. An important argument to disprove the alleged Marcionite 
origin of  the motif  is the absolute lack of  a divine dichotomy, either 
between the righteous and the good God, or between the highest God 
and the creator. 
Besides, it is not in a general argument by the writer that the text 
presses charges of  envy against God. Rather, it is the devil—a clear 
antagonist whom the text depicts as a deceiver acting out of  malice and 
hatred against God and the fi rst couple—who issues the accusation. 
This argument seems to be supported by the fact that, differently than 
in Gnostic texts that rewrite the Paradise story,14 the serpent is clearly 
said to “deceive” Eve (LAE 111–112; 124–123). 
Last but not least, the transgression does not report any good for the 
fi rst couple, as is the case in the Gnostic texts that endorse the theory 
of  divine envy as a background for the prohibition. As in the Biblical 
story, Eve not only does not achieve what she strives for, but she is also 
expelled together with Adam from Paradise, as a punishment for her 
disobedience. 
[96.3–15]. He then brings in Aristotle’s Rhetorica in order to affi rm afterwards that 
the previous examples are in fact diverse. The most important problem, however, is 
that the passage from LAE is confusingly included as if  the reference to God’s envy 
were a general argument by the writer. Rather, on the contrary, the charges of  envy 
are issued by the devil in the form of  the serpent in a way that closely resembles the 
Biblical story. 
10 R.M. Grant, Theophilus of  Antioch Ad Autolycum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 67.
11 A. von Harnack, Marcion: das Evangelium vom fremden Gott (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1924), 
414–15, who refers to Ambrosius, De Paradiso 6.30.
12 Van Unnik, “Der Neid,” 125–26.
13 Theophilus, Ad Autolycum II 25, διὸ οὐχ ὡς φθονῶν αὐτῷ ὁ θεός, ὡς οἴονται τινες, 
ἐκέλευσεν μὴ ἐσθίειν ἀπὸ τῆς γνώσεως; Irenaeus, Haer. 3.23.6, Quampropter et eicit eum de 
Paradiso et a ligno vitae longe transtulit, non invidens ei lignum vitae, quemadmodum audent quidam 
dicere, sed miserans eius.
14 G.P. Luttikhuizen, Gnostic Revisions of  Genesis Stories and Early Jesus Traditions (NHMS 
58; Leiden: Brill, 2005), 76 points out that a signifi cant difference between the Biblical 
story and its Gnostic revisions lies in the fact that the latter do not affi rm, as the former 
does, that the serpent deluded or seduced Eve.
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It seems obvious, consequently, that the author does not endorse 
this view. On the contrary, he puts the accusation in the mouth of  
the serpent, as a paraphrasing and amplifying version of  the Genesis 
story that makes explicit what a reader of  the Hellenistic period might 
interpret as implicit in the text. After all, according to Wisdom, the 
devil was held responsible for introducing envy to the world.15
This becomes clear by closely comparing LAE to its Biblical model. 
The Genesis story is well known, but I include it in order to facilitate 
the comparison of  both passages. The fi rst relevant section is Gen 
2:16–17, in which God commands Adam not to eat from the tree of  
knowledge of  good and evil:
καὶ ἐνετείλατο κύριος ὁ θεὸς τῷ Αδαμ λέγων ἀπὸ παντὸς ξύλου τοῦ ἐν 
τῷ παραδείσῳ βρώσει φάγῃ 17 ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ξύλου τοῦ γινώσκειν καλὸν 
καὶ πονηρὸν οὐ φάγεσθε ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ ᾗ δ’ ἄν ἡμέρα φάγητε ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ 
θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖσθε.
The other passage is Gen 3:2–7, in which the actual conversation 
between the snake and Eve takes place:
καὶ εἶπεν ἡ γυνὴ τῷ ὄφει ἀπὸ καρποῦ ξύλου τοῦ παραδείσου φαγόμεθα 3 
ἀπὸ δὲ καρποῦ τοῦ ξύλου ὅ ἐστιν ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ παραδείσου εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς 
οὐ φάγεσθε ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ οὐδὲ μὴ ἅψησθε αὐτοῦ ἵνα μὴ ἀποθάνητε 4 καὶ 
εἶπεν ὁ ὄφις τῇ γυναικί οὐ θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖσθε 5 ἤδει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἐν 
ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ φάγητε ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ διανοιχθήσονται ὑμῶν οἱ ὀφθαλμοί καὶ 
ἔσεσθε ὡς θεοὶ γινώσκοντες καλὸν καὶ πονηρόν.
It is not diffi cult to see that LAE actually confl ates both sections of  Genesis, 
since Eve declares that they might not eat from the “tree in the middle 
of  Paradise,” as in Gen 3:3, and, should they do so, the result will 
be that “they will surely die,” as in Gen 2:17 (θανάτῳ ἀποθανεῖσθε). 
However, LAE nevertheless preserves all the important details without 
changing the basic story. 
As a matter of  fact, one might, at the most, accuse LAE’s devil of  
overinterpreting the Genesis sentence: ἤδει γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἐν ᾗ ἂν ἡμέρᾳ 
φάγητε ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ διανοιχθήσονται ὑμῶν οἱ ὀφθαλμοί καὶ ἔσεσθε ὡς 
θεοὶ γινώσκοντες καλὸν καὶ πονηρόν. But how should this sentence 
actually be explained? How should we understand the devil’s assertion 
in the Biblical passage that the prohibition not to eat of  the tree of  
knowledge of  good and evil is due to the fact that “God knows that 
15 Wis 2:24, φθόνῳ δὲ διαβόλου θάνατος εἰσῆλθεν εὶς τὸν κόσμον.
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on the day you eat of  it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like 
gods, knowing good and evil.” 
The fi rst possible explanation could be that the serpent of  the Genesis 
story simply intended to underline the inherent limits of  the human 
condition, by establishing a clear-cut difference between the divine and 
human spheres—Adam and Eve possess eternal life but not unlimited 
knowledge. In doing so, the serpent’s intention would be simply tempt-
ing Eve by establishing, fi rst, the difference between the human and 
divine spheres in order to point immediately afterwards to that which 
apparently could blur these borders. From this perspective the theme of  
the Genesis story would be Eve’s hybris, an arrogant attitude on her side 
that would lead her to transgress the prohibition in order to achieve 
divine status. This explanation implies a culture in which the world of  
the gods and that of  human beings is unbridgeable, an archaic reli-
gious conscience, of  which Greek mythology also provides numerous 
examples and according to which any human attempt to trespass the 
inherent limits results in his ruin.16
However, that the serpent of  the Biblical passage had God’s envy 
in mind as a reason for the prohibition of  course remains a possibility. 
The Biblical passage is ambiguous enough not to allow such a clear-cut 
distinction between the divine and human spheres, at least not at the 
moment that the whole Paradise story takes place: Adam and Eve are 
the fi rst humans, but they live in Paradise and possess eternal life. Even 
though they are creatures of  God, and therefore inferior to him, in one 
possible interpretation, they nonetheless posses certain divine attributes 
that bring them close to God. It is from this perspective that envy as a 
background for God’s motivation becomes a possible interpretation. 
I think it is precisely in this context that we have to place LAE ’s version 
of  the serpent’s words, since it deliberately blurs the borders between 
the divine and human spheres and, by placing God and men side by 
side, introduces them in a comparative frame. The key of  the devil’s 
16 See, for example, the famous cases of  Tantalus and Bellerophontes, which perfectly 
exemplify the loss of  human measure (κόρος), the arrogant attitude that follows it (the 
ὕβρις ἀτάσθαλον), and the punishment of  the gods it necessarily attracts, a sort of  
blindness (ἄτη), which results in their ruin. Both mythological heroes were favoured 
by the gods with a steady well-being (the former shared the table with them and the 
latter was supported in all his affairs), as a result of  which they thought they were as 
infallible as the gods. In the case of  Bellerophontes, his attempt to blur the borders 
between the divine and human spheres is properly punished in way that clearly reaf-
fi rms them: angry with him when he tried to reach the Olympus on his winged horse 
Pegasus, Zeus simply sent an insignifi cant mosquito to face him. 
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interpretation lies in the meaning he gives to the section: ἔσεσθε ὡς 
θεοί. While the Biblical passage depicts divine status, to which eternity 
and knowledge belong, namely “you will become gods,” in LAE the 
serpent interprets the expression as “to be like God is.” With this in 
mind, the devil introduces an explicit explanation (149–150): τοῦτο δὲ 
γινώσκων ὁ θεὸς ὅτι ἔσεσθε ὅμοιοι αὐτοῦ, ἐφθόνησεν ὑμῖν κτλ. (“As 
God knew that you would become like him, he envied you, etc.”). By 
referring to God’s envious grudge and thus implying the possibility of  
Eve’s existential promotion, the serpent triggers her envy. 
LAE ’s amplifi cation and epexegetic sentence clearly introduces an 
interpretation of  the Biblical passage, but do we need to suppose an 
external source to explain this paraphrase? In point of  fact, LAE ’s 
paraphrase looks more like a gloss on the text, as a commentary that 
intended to clarify the expression ὡς θεοί, rather than a radical inter-
pretation of  the Biblical passage. 
In a last analysis, the devil’s intention in Genesis is as denigratory 
as in LAE. Independently of  the explanation one gives to the serpent’s 
assertion, either as an authoritative denial or as an envious grudge, the 
fact remains that it seduces Eve who, the victim of  hybris or of  envy, 
yields to her desire to achieve that which might make her a god or 
like the gods. 
The passages by Theophilus and Irenaeus may or may not refl ect 
the “Meinung bestimmter Lehrer,”17 as van Unnik affi rms, but in my 
view, what they do not necessarily echo is a Gnostic or pre-Gnostic 
appropriation and reinterpretation of  the Paradise story. They might 
simply testify to explanatory attempts concerning what the serpent was 
actually asserting in the Genesis account. 
3. The Envy of the Demiurge according to 
some Gnostic Texts
In the Gnostic retelling of  the Genesis story one fi nds a wholly differ-
ent conceptual world. For the fi rst time one can speak of  a revision in 
the strict sense of  the word, since the story is included in a completely 
new narrative frame. The scene becomes an essential episode both in 
the history of  human devaluation—from the heights of  transcendence 
to the lowest abode of  the sublunar world—and in the process of  the 
17 Van Unnik, “Der Neid,” 125–26.
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recovery of  the primal condition. Consequently, Gnostic texts includ-
ing a rewriting of  the story completely alter the setting, the actors, 
their identities, interpersonal relations, and the reasons that determine 
human and divine motivation.18
To begin with, all the Nag Hammadi texts dealing with the passage 
endorse the second of  the possible interpretations (above) of  God’s 
prohibition, namely, they recognise the background of  a grudging 
envious attitude towards the fi rst humans. An obvious corollary of  this 
interpretation is that, according to the Gnostics, the Paradise story could 
not be describing the actions of  the real God.19 Behind this view we 
may have the infl uence of  Plato’s assertion that God is free of  envy in 
Phaedrus and Timaeus,20 or, even more importantly, Plato’s conception 
of  (descendant) envy as the most serious obstacle to the development 
and transmission of  virtue, which can be found in the Laws and several 
other places.21 However, an interesting passage from the fi rst book of  
Aristotle’s Metaphysics might provide an even more suitable parallel for 
the theme we are dealing with. In discussing the question whether or 
not knowledge about greater matters is beyond human power—namely 
knowledge about the phenomena of  the moon, the sun, and the stars, 
and about the genesis of  the universe—the Philosopher categorically 
denies the possibility of  an envious divinity who withholds knowledge 
from humans:
18 As Luttikhuizen, Gnostic Revisions, 75, has pointed out, the Testimony of  Truth, for 
example, “does not entirely reject the biblical Paradise story. In fact, the actual events 
are not doubted. The controversy concerns the identity of  the actors appearing in the 
story (the creator, the serpent and the fi rst human beings) and the real meaning of  
what was said and what was done.” 
19 See, for example, the conclusion to Testim. Truth’s retelling of  the Paradise Story 
(NHC IX,3; 48.1–4): “What sort of  God is this? First [he] was envious of  Adam that 
he should eat from the tree of  knowledge. And secondly he said, ‘Adam where are 
you?’ So, God did not have foreknowledge? . . . What sort of  God is this? Indeed, great 
is the blindness of  those who read (this) and have not recognized him!”
20 Plato, Phdr. 247 A 7, φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται; Tim. 29E 1–2, ἀγαθὸς 
ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος. 
21 Plato, Laws 730E–731A 2 generally deals with those cases in which descendant envy 
is an obstacle for a good functioning of  the polis: the fi rst place in honour corresponds 
to him, who having achieved sophrosyne and phronesis does not impede others from achiev-
ing it, but rather actively helps them to do so. In the lowest place of  social esteem, we 
fi nd the envious individual who has the spiritual goods and intentionally prevents others 
from reaching them; see also Prot. 327A 4–327B 6, where the unenvious transmission 
of  arete and justice is also the basis of  a well-functioning polis. In Menex. 93C 6–9, envy 
is an obstacle to the transmission of  arete from parents to children (cf. Hipp. Maj. 283E 
6 and Pseudo-Plato, De virtute). See L. Roig Lanzillotta, La envidia en el pensamiento griego: 
Desde la época arcaica al helenismo (Diss., Univ. Complutense, 1997), 419–24.
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If, then, there is something in what the poets say, and jealousy is natural 
to the divine power, it would probably occur in this case above all, and 
all who excelled in this knowledge would be unfortunate. But the divine 
power cannot be jealous (nay, according to the proverb, “bards tell a 
lie”), nor should any other science be thought more honourable than 
one of  this sort.22 
According to the Gnostic view, consequently, the Paradise story depicts 
the attempts by the lower Demiurge (on occasion, by the rulers of  the 
material world)23 to prevent humans from coming to know themselves 
and their real nature.24 There are several texts that include a revision 
of  the Genesis story.25 Obviating now the particular differences, we may 
generally sketch the rewriting as follows. 
After the Demiurge (or the rulers) has involuntarily insuffl ated the 
Mother’s light power in Adam, the fi rst man is cast down by the 
creator to the lowest regions of  matter, lest he come to know his true 
superior nature. 
As could be expected, however, the good and higher God intervenes 
in order that humans may come to know their true belonging and may 
begin their way back to their original abode. With this in mind, he 
sends a helper to assist them,26 which is normally the serpent27 but, on 
occasion, can also be Christ himself  28 or even an eagle sitting on the 
tree—which is actually Epinoia, the Light Refl ection.29
22 Aristotle, Metaph. 982 B 32–983 A 5. In this trend, see Gos. Truth (NHC II,3) 
18.34–19.10; Tri. Trac. (NHC I,5) 62.20–33; Interpr. Know. (NHC XI,1) 15.18–21.
23 Ap. John (NHC II,1) 22.3–7; BG 57.8–18.
24 See Testim. Truth (NHC IX,3) 47.28–30; 48.8–13; Hyp. Arch. (NHC II,4) 90.6–10; 
Orig. World (NHC II,5) 119.5
25 So, for example, Ap. John (NHX II,1) 21.16–22.15; Testim. Truth (NHC IX,3) 
47.14–48.13; Hyp. Arch. (NHC II,4) 89.31–90.19; Orig. World (NHC II,5) 118.16–119.18; 
cf. Gos. Truth. (NHC I,3) 18.24–29.
26 Ap. John (NHC II) 20.9–19 (BG 52.17–53.10), “The Blessed Father had mercy on 
the power of  the Mother which had been drawn out of  the fi rst ruler . . . And through 
his benefi cent Spirit and his great mercy, he sent a helper to Adam.”
27 Hyp. Arch. (NHC II,4) 90.6, 31. In this text, however, the instructor is actually the 
female spiritual principle that comes in the snake and teaches them (see 89.31–32); 
Orig. World (NHC II,5) 119.25–27.
28 Ap. John (NHC II,1) 22.9. See also Gos. Truth (NHC I,3) 18.24–29, which, in an 
allusion to Gen 3:3, says that Christ was nailed on the cross and “became the fruit of  
knowledge of  the Father. It did not, however, cause destruction because it was eaten, 
but to those who ate it, it gave (cause) to become glad in the discovery.”
29 Ap. John (BG 60.19–61.7). On the motif  of  the eagle, see I. Czachesz, “The 
Eagle on the Tree: A Homeric Motif  in Jewish and Christian Literature,” in Jerusalem, 
Alexandria, Rome: Studies in Ancient Cultural Interaction in Honour of  A. Hilhorst (ed. F. García 
Martínez and G.P. Luttikhuizen; JSJSup 82; Leiden: Brill, 2003), 87–106.
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It is in this context that the Paradise scene is framed. Adam and Eve 
have received the commandment not to eat from the tree of  knowledge 
not from God but from the Demiurge, and this with a view to keep-
ing them ignorant of  their superior condition. Here we fi nd the fi rst 
relevant transformation: the actors of  the story have been changed. It 
is not the higher God who is envious, but the lower one. Aware of  the 
latter’s stratagem, the higher divinity intervenes to frustrate his inten-
tions, since he is in fact willing humans to achieve knowledge. As the 
Gospel of  Truth asserts, God does not withhold knowledge from humans, 
but temporarily retains their perfection “granting it to them as a return 
to him and a perfect and unitary knowledge.”30
As an emissary of  the supreme God, the serpent is the “instructor” 
who will inform Eve about the real reason of  the prohibition and 
encourage her to eat from the tree of  knowledge so that her eyes 
might be opened. Its role, consequently, is also reversed: from being 
the seducer (in Genesis) or, as a means for the devil, the introducer of  
envy to the world (LAE ), it becomes now the benefactor of  humanity. 
In accordance with its positive role in the story, its description acquires 
a more favourable character. As G.P. Luttikhuizen has pointed out, the 
Testimony of  Truth notably upgrades the serpent, which no longer belongs 
to the earth but to Paradise and is described as an “animal” instead 
of  as a “beast.”31 
The same transformation applies, of  course, to the results of  the trans-
gression committed by the fi rst humans. Once they eat from the tree, 
the fi rst thing Adam and Eve become aware of  is their imperfection, 
due to their lack of  gnosis. The transgression is, consequently, no longer 
the beginning of  the fall, but rather the beginning of  the recovery of  
their lost condition, insofar as awareness of  one’s own imperfection is 
a precondition for reaching perfection.32 It is this knowledge that will 
start the gradual process of  self-knowledge that in its turn will allow 
the ascent and recovery of  their primal condition. 
As an example of  the previous generalising sketch of  the Gnostic 
rewriting of  the Paradise story, it will suffi ce now to present one of  the 
versions. It is perhaps the Hypostasis of  the Archons that includes the most 
compact account of  the story:
30 See Gos. Truth (NHC II,3) 18.34–19.10.
31 See Luttikhuizen, Gnostic Revision, 76–77.
32 See Gos. Truth (NHC I,3) 21.14–25.
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Then the female spiritual principle came in the snake, the instructor, and 
it taught them, saying, “What did he say to you? Was it, ‘From every 
tree in the garden shall you eat; yet—from the tree of  recognizing evil 
and good do not eat’?”
The carnal woman said, “Not only did he say ‘Do not eat,’ but even 
‘Do not touch it; for the day you eat from it, with death you are going 
to die.’ ”33
The introductory section already reveals important differences: to begin 
with, the snake remains an implement of  a higher instance, but in this 
case is not, as in LAE, the devil that speaks through it, but the female 
spiritual principle. The revaluation of  the snake is clear not only in its 
description as “the instructor,” but also in the fact that it is acquainted 
with the words the Demiurge issued to Eve. The divergences increase 
as the text goes on:
And the snake, the instructor, said, “With death you shall not die; for it 
was out of  jealousy that he said this to you. Rather your eyes shall open 
and you shall come to be like gods, recognizing evil and good.” And the 
female spiritual principle was taken away from the snake. 
It is interesting to note that in the present passage, even though clearly 
attributing envy to the Demiurge, there is no interest in explaining the 
reason behind it. Obviating every attempt to search for a logical expla-
nation, the Gnostic rewriting simply explains the prohibition, since the 
transformation of  the narrative frame and actors of  the story is explicit 
enough. “And the carnal woman took from the tree and ate; and she 
gave to her husband as well as herself  . . . And their imperfection became 
apparent in their lack of  acquaintance; and they recognized that they 
were naked of  the spiritual element.” 
The outcome of  the transgression is rather different as well. The fi rst 
thing they realise is their imperfection, namely their lack of  acquain-
tance, and then they notice that they are naked of  the spiritual element. 
Conclusions
I think that the above analysis suffi ciently demonstrates that the inter-
pretation of  the Paradise story provided by the LAE does not introduce 
important changes in its Biblical model. Admittedly, the motif  of  God’s 
33 Hyp. Arch. (NHC II,4) 89.31–90.5.
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envy as a background to his prohibition to Adam and Eve to eat from 
the tree of  knowledge of  good and evil does not appear in the words 
of  the snake of  Genesis and represents a clear addition to the text. 
However, given the two possible interpretations of  the snake’s accusa-
tion, namely God’s authoritative denying or envious grudge, LAE made 
use of  the latter both because it ideally suited the conceptual context 
created by Wisdom’s assertion that death came into the world through 
the devil’s envy, and because Eve’s envy was more appealing to a Hel-
lenistic reader than hybris as a reason for her transgression. 
Consequently, there is nothing in LAE’s version of  the story that 
might allow us to discover behind it the likely, but thus far unproved, 
attribution of  envy to the God of  the Old Testament by Marcionites. 
Gnostic revisions of  the Paradise story, however, present a completely 
different world of  ideas. The appropriation of  the motif  of  envy as a 
background for God’s prohibition, which the Gnostic texts dealt with 
freely endorse, provided them with a convenient support for their own 
views. On the one hand, it gave them the opportunity to explain both 
the true cause of  human degradation and the need for self-knowledge 
in order to retrace the steps of  devaluation. On the other, the Paradise 
story offered a perfect opportunity to show on the basis of  Genesis itself  
that the God of  the Old Testament could hardly be the loving and 
merciful God of  their creed. This envious God simply did not meet 
the high requirements of  a concept of  divinity that was already under 
the infl uence of  the Platonic-Peripatetic theology.
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